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1173 
OF ARMS AND THE MILITIA: GUN REGULATION BY DEFINING 
“ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT” 
 
Edward J. Curtis, Jr.* 
ABSTRACT 
Recent mass shootings have placed pressure on Congress and 
state legislatures to regulate semi-automatic rifles and handguns in the 
interest of public safety.1  However, the Second Amendment provides 
that, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”2  There is no obvious public safety exception. 
Semi-automatic rifles, handguns, and other kinds of arms can 
be regulated more effectively by defining the “ordinary military 
equipment” militia members are expected to provide. This may be 
accomplished using the rationale employed by the United States 
Supreme Court in its 1939 decision of United States v. Miller,3 which 
 
* Edward J. Curtis, Jr., is an attorney who retired from the Office of the Attorney 
General for the State of New York after more than twenty-five years of service.  In 
the course of his work in that office, Mr. Curtis defended the constitutionality of 
several New York State statutes concerning psychiatric treatment, including 
Kendra's Law for Assisted Outpatient Treatment, Governor Pataki's Sexually Violent 
Predator initiative, and the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. Mr. Curtis 
would like to thank his friend and colleague, June Duffy, for her comments on an 
early draft of this article. 
1 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN 2020 at 2, 18-19 (2021).  The Federal Bureau of Investigation designated 
forty shootings in 2020 as "active shooter" incidents, which is defined as "one or 
more individuals . . . killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area."  Id. at 
2.  The report notes that "[i]mplicit in this definition is the shooter's use of a firearm."  
Id. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
3 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“[I]t is not within judicial notice that [a short-barreled 
shotgun] is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute 
to the common defense.” (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154, 158 
(1840))). 
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upheld the National Firearms Act of 1934.4  The Firearms Act 
regulated automatic weapons, including machine guns, short-barreled 
shotguns, and short-barreled rifles, by requiring possessors to register 
them and pay a substantial tax.5  In its 2008 decision of District of 
Columbia v. Heller,6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in 
Miller.7 
In Heller, the Supreme Court found that the Second 
Amendment protected an individual's right to keep and bear arms.8  
The Court in Heller stated that Miller “stands only for the proposition 
that the Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to 
certain types of weapons” and that it “does not protect those weapons 
not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, 
such as short-barreled shotguns.”9  Thus, the rationale employed in 
Miller is still effective and shows how certain types of weapons may 
be regulated. 
I. UPHOLDING THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT 
In Miller, criminal charges brought against two men found in 
possession of a short-barreled shotgun were dismissed by the district 
court on the ground that the National Firearms Act violated the Second 
Amendment.10  The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s 
decision and upheld the Firearms Act by ruling that it could not take 
judicial notice that the Act did not have a “reasonable relation to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,” and therefore, it 
could not “say that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right to 
keep and bear” weapons such as short-barreled shotguns.11 
The Court’s ruling in Miller offers Congress and state 
legislatures powerful tools to ensure their gun regulations are upheld 
by the courts.  It was Congress which determined in 1934 that short-
barreled shotguns were “weapons not typically possessed by law-
 
4 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62. 
5 See id. 
6 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
7 Id. at 621-22, 624. 
8 Id. at 591, 595. 
9 Id. at 623, 625. 
10 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1939). 
11 Id. at 178. 
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abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”12  Prior to that time short-
barreled shotguns were legal to obtain and possess.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court indicated that a legitimate object of the National 
Firearms Act could be Congress's intention to preserve the militia and 
make it more efficient.  
A layperson reading Miller might think that the decision 
merely required the defendants to prove that the military used machine 
guns and short-barreled rifles and shotguns.  The Supreme Court stated 
in Heller that this “would be a startling reading of the [Miller] opinion, 
since it would mean that the National Firearms Act's restrictions on 
machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, 
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.”13  Miller's reference to 
“ordinary military equipment,” Heller explained, meant arms “of the 
kind in common use at the time.”14  As short-barreled shotguns could 
legally be purchased and possessed before the 1934 Firearms Act, 
Miller and Heller indicate that Congress and state legislatures can 
define what ordinary military equipment is in common use so long as 
those legislative bodies are crafting such definitions for the 
preservation and efficiency of a well-regulated militia.15 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o 
raise and support armies.”16  The Constitution also gives Congress the 
power “[t]o provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of 
the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”17  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Heller, “the militia is assumed by Article 
I already to be in existence.”18  The militia in colonial America was 
understood to consist of “all able-bodied men.”19  Armies, by contrast, 
must be created.20 
 
12 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
13 Id. at 624. 
14 Id. at 624-25. 
15 See id. at 622. 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
17 Id. 
18 Heller, 554 U.S. at 596 (emphasis in original). 
19 Id. at 580-81, 596. 
20 Id. at 596. 
3
Curtis: Of Arms and the Militia
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center,
1176 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
 
II. DESCRIBING “ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT” 
In Miller, when upholding the National Firearms Act, the 
Supreme Court referred to Aymette v. State,21 an 1840 decision of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court.  The court in Aymette upheld, against a 
challenge under the Tennessee Constitution's version of the Second 
Amendment, the conviction of a man who, while uttering threats 
against another man for whom he was searching, was found to have 
violated Tennessee law by concealing a knife under his clothing.22  
Although Aymette was decided 180 years ago, it contains useful 
legal analysis distinguishing military weapons.  Unlike Miller in 1939 
or Heller in 2008, in 1840, the states periodically mustered their 
militias for the purpose of training them.23  Volunteers from the militia 
supplemented the professional army on military expeditions.24  At the 
time Aymette was decided, the Georgia State Militia was assisting the 
U.S. Army in the Second Seminole War.25  Volunteers from the militia 
“provided the bulk of the manpower to fight the Mexican War, Civil 
War, and the Spanish-American War.”26  The court in Aymette 
understood what was expected of the militia.  Suppressing 
insurrections and repelling invasions was, in 1840, an imaginable 
objective for the militia. 
The court in Aymette specifically held that the legislature had 
the right “to prohibit the wearing, or keeping weapons dangerous to 
the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in civilized 
warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence.”27  In its 
opinion, the court distinguished between those weapons “which are 
usually employed in private broils, and which are efficient only in the 
hands of the robber or assassin,” which the court described as “useless 
 
21 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840). 
22 Id. at 155, 161-62. 
23 See generally GIAN GENTILE, MICHAEL E. LINICK, & MICHAEL SHURKIN, THE 
EVOLUTION OF U.S. MILITARY POLICY FROM THE CONSTITUTION TO THE PRESENT 
13-28 (2017) (hereinafter G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY). 
24 Id. at 18. 
25  JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE SECOND SEMINOLE WAR 1835-1842 
(University Press of Florida ed., 1985). 
26 G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 18. 
27 Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) at 159. 
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in war,” and “ordinary military equipment” used “in civilized 
warfare.”28 
Additionally, the court noted that the militia's military duties 
could not be accomplished with concealed weapons.29  Arms for the 
common defense “must necessarily be borne openly; so that a 
prohibition to bear them openly, would be a denial of the right 
altogether.”30 
Accordingly, by using the rationale set out in Miller, Congress 
and each state legislature can use objective military considerations to 
regulate the “ordinary military equipment” which its militia members 
are expected to provide when called.31  Regulation using military 
considerations can reasonably be attributed to an intent on the 
legislature's part to preserve and promote the efficiency of its militia. 
III. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF MILLER IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
There is a reasonable explanation as to why Congress or state 
legislatures did not choose to define “ordinary military equipment” in 
their legislation earlier.  In 1942, soon after Miller was decided, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Cases v. United 
States,32 affirmed the conviction of a man, who, having previously 
been convicted of a felony, was charged with possessing a revolver in 
violation of the Federal Firearms Act of 1934.33  In the course of its 
opinion the First Circuit criticized the Miller holding as “already 
outdated, in spite of the fact that it was formulated only three and a half 
years ago, because of the well-known fact that in the so called 
'Commando Units' some sort of military use seems to have been found 
for almost any modern lethal weapon.”34  Instead, the First Circuit 
found that the man was not a member of any military organization and 
the Second Amendment did not bar the Firearms Act.35 
 
28 Id. at 158.  
29 Id. at 159-60. 
30 Id. at 160-61; see also Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876). 
31 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
32 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942). 
33 Id. at 925. 
34 Id. at 922.  
35 Id. at 923.  
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There are at least three problems with the criticism of the Miller 
holding by the First Circuit in Cases.36  The first is that the First 
Circuit's analysis equated the unorganized militia with a company of 
the regular army.37  The militia is a class of individuals who are not 
organized and are not subject to military discipline, unlike the regular 
army.38  The second problem with the First Circuit's analysis is that it 
equated members of the militia with “Commando Units,” which are 
elite organizations of soldiers within the regular army.39  Members of 
the militia cannot be assumed to have any military training, unlike the 
members of “Commando Units.”40  Finally, the First Circuit noted that 
there was some military usefulness for “almost any modern lethal 
weapon.”41  This overlooked the definition of “ordinary military 
equipment” contained in Miller, which excluded from the protection 
of the Second Amendment certain weapons that have a military use, 
including machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled 
rifles.42 
In his brief in Miller, the Solicitor General had argued in the 
alternative that the Second Amendment was a “collective right.”43  The 
Miller decision did not mention this argument.44  However, after the 
First Circuit's decision in Cases, the “collective rights” theory was 
adopted by several circuit courts of appeals in upholding gun 
 
36 Id. at 922. 
37 Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (“[T]he Militia 
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common 
defense”), with CLAYTON R. NEWELL, REGULAR ARMY, THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 
A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY, at 180 (2002) (“[t]hat portion of the army in the full-
time service of the federal government.”).  
38 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.  
39 EDWARD LUTTWAK AND STUART KOEHL, COMMANDO, THE DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN WAR, at 136 (1991) (“The term [“Commando”] is now applied officially to 
units of the British Royal Marines, and unofficially to many other elite units trained 
for special operations.”). 
40 Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.   
41 Id. 
42 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
43 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008).  
44 See generally Miller, 307 U.S. at 174-83. 
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regulations.45  The collective rights theory was rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Heller.46 
Another question is why the Supreme Court did not state in 
Heller that Congress or the state legislatures could use objective 
military considerations to regulate firearms.  The federal courts cannot 
issue so-called “advisory opinions” or make any decision that would 
not affect the rights of the litigants before them.47  Since Heller could 
be resolved without further analysis of the Second Amendment, no 
further discussion of the right was necessary.  The Supreme Court did 
note that the Second Amendment right “was not unlimited” and that 
the Court did “not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of 
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”48 
In its conclusion, the Court in Heller stated that, “the 
Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for 
combating [the problem of handgun violence], including some 
measures regulating handguns.”49  The Court referred to its earlier 
statement that it recognized “another important limitation” in Miller's 
statement “that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common 
use at the time,’” which the Court considered “fairly supported by the 
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and 
unusual weapons.’”50 
Finally, there is the question of the militia's usefulness at this 
time.  When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the United States 
was confronted with a number of potential enemies, including Britain, 
France, Spain, and various hostile Indian tribes.51  Today the United 
States has no close foreign enemies.  The militia is no longer mustered 
and there does not seem to be any need for it.  Nevertheless, the Second 
 
45 United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases 
indicating that the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals had 
adopted the “collective rights model” of the Second Amendment). 
46 Heller, 554 U.S. at 591 (“Putting all of these textual elements together, we find 
that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”).  
47 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (“Early in its history, 
this Court held that it had no power to issue advisory opinions.”). 
48 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.  
49 Id. at 636.  
50 Id. at 627.  
51 See generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE 
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802 at 40-45 (Free 
Press ed., 1975). 
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Amendment assumes that the militia is necessary to the security of a 
free state and the Supreme Court permits legislative regulation of 
ordinary military equipment, whether or not the militia is needed. 
IV. THE TYPES OF REGULATION HELLER AND MILLER SUPPORT 
To summarize, the findings in Miller indicated that the 
Supreme Court would uphold legislation reasonably related “to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia.”52  The Court in 
Heller stated that a legislature could not prohibit “an entire class of 
arms.”53  The protection of the Second Amendment extended to 
“certain types of weapons” which were “in common use at the time” 
and which could be classified as “ordinary military equipment.”54  The 
protection of the Second Amendment did not extend to “dangerous and 
unusual weapons” of a kind “not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes.”55  The Court in Heller further stated that 
the weapons could be used for self-protection, though it referred to 
protection of “the hearth and home,” and added that it did not read the 
Second Amendment as permitting arms to be carried “for any sort of 
confrontation.”56  The particular restrictions permitted by the decision 
in Miller, and endorsed in Heller, affected the type of action the 
firearms used and the firearms' barrel length.57  
The United States Constitution, in Article 1, Section 8, reserves 
to the states the right to appoint officers and train their militias.58  
United States military policy no longer relies on the militia.59  The 
militia “is primarily a state institution.”60  Moreover, the United States 
 
52 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).  
53 554 U.S. at 628. 
54 Id. at 623-25.  
55 Id. at 627.  
56 Id. at 595, 636. 
57 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62 (containing the National Firearms Act of 1934); United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (discussing short-barreled shotguns); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (discussing 
“machineguns”). 
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
59 See generally, G. GENTILE, ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY. 
60 S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 478 
(1917) (A member of U.S. Army Judge Advocate General Corps discusses the militia 
in the context of writs of habeas corpus brought against the federal government “for 
8
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government “has only a limited control over [the militia] for the limited 
purposes expressed by the Constitution.”61  By making legislative 
findings concerning the likely composition of its militia, the extent of 
training its militia members probably have, and the firearms and other 
weapons best suited for the duties that its untrained militia could be 
expected to accomplish, Congress or a state legislature could regulate 
firearms and other weapons with laws that the courts would be 
reluctant to overturn.62 
A. Legislative Findings 
As a general matter, courts consider legislative bodies to be 
better equipped to collect evidence and make determinations about the 
best way to enact laws to achieve a given objective.  This article 
recommends that legislative bodies make legislative findings to define 
“ordinary military equipment” in order to preserve and promote the 
efficiency of a well-regulated militia. 63  When Congress or a state 
legislature makes legislative findings, the courts are inclined to defer 
to the legislative intent expressed in those findings.64 
The inclination to defer to legislative determinations is 
particularly pronounced in the area of military decision-making.  As a 
matter of policy, courts have been historically reluctant to second-
guess military decisions because these decisions require expert 
knowledge and the courts believe that they do not have the expertise 
to make military decisions.65  For example, in its 1972 decision of 
 
the release of some member of the forces subjected to the call” usually on the ground 
of minority).  
61 Id. 
62 Although this article recommends that the “ordinary military equipment” be 
defined by the legislature, it is worth noting that Miller upheld the 1934 Firearms Act 
without referring to the Act's legislative history.  Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (“[I]t is not 
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment 
or that its use would contribute to the common defense.”). 
63 Id.  
64 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (upholding statute 
authorizing commitment for sexually violent predators and noting that the Supreme 
Court “ordinarily defer[s] to the legislature's stated intent”).  
65 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area 
of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence . . . [than] 
professional military judgments.”). 
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Gilligan v. Morgan,66 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to 
“training, weaponry and orders” of the Ohio National Guard following 
the Kent State shootings, noting that “congressional and executive 
authority to prescribe and regulate the National Guard . . .  clearly 
precludes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters.”67 
B. The Preservation and Efficiency of the Militia 
The phrase “the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia” was not explained and does not appear to be a term of art.68  
Accordingly, the words “preservation” and “efficiency” are entitled to 
their normal and ordinary meaning.69 
The normal and ordinary meaning of “preservation” is to save 
and maintain what already exists and to protect it from destruction or 
degradation.70  While the Second Amendment makes no reference to 
public safety, the use of the word “preservation” suggests that ensuring 
the safety of militia members would be a reasonable consideration of 
the legislature.71  
The normal and ordinary meaning of “efficiency” suggests that 
an objective is achieved effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, 
or effort.72  This, in turn, indicates that in regulating the militia a 




67 Id. at 7-8 (internal punctuation omitted). 
68 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008). 
69 Cf. id. at 577 (“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its 
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning.”). 
70 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (5th Ed. 1979); Preserve, THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 980 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “preserve” as the ability “to keep 
safe from injury, peril, or other adversity”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “preserve” as the ability “to keep safe from 
injury, harm, or destruction”).  
71 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“[T]he preservation and 
efficiency of a well regulated militia.”). 
72 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 440 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “efficient” as 
“[a]cting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary 
effort”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 1988) 
(defining “efficient” as being “productive without waste”). 
10
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C. The Likely Composition of the Militia 
A legislature's first step in regulating the militia is to determine 
the militia's likely composition.  There is a tendency today to use the 
word “militia” as a synonym for any armed gang.  However, it is 
apparent from the language of the Constitution and the Second 
Amendment that the purpose of the militia in the United States of 
America is to protect the federal government and the individual 
states.73  Individuals or groups cannot organize their own militias.74  
Each state is in control of its own militia.  
The founders initially favored militias because they distrusted 
standing armies.75  At least some of the founders believed that, to the 
extent that the United States would need military power, such a need 
would be intermittent and could be satisfied by the militia.76  In the 
Federalist Papers, James Madison predicted that the United States' 
militia could provide a force “near half a million of citizens with arms 
in their hands . . . .”77  By way of comparison, in 1790 the population 
of the United States was less than 4 million.78  In 2010, the population 
of the United States was more than 308 million.79  Extrapolating from 
James Madison's number, the United States' total militia would easily 
number in the millions and, in fact, many individual state militias 
would number in the millions.80 
Unfortunately, soon after the Bill of Rights was ratified, it 
became evident that the militia did not have the discipline or 
professionalism needed to satisfy the military needs of the new 
 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State . . . .”). 
74 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (“[T]he Second 
Amendment . . . does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary 
organizations.” (citing Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886))). 
75 Id. at 595. 
76 Id. 
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). 
78 1790 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1790_fast_fa
cts.html. 
79 2010 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/2010_fast_fa
cts.html. 
80 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (proposing that the militia of the United 
States could produce a force of “near half a million of citizens . . . .”). 
11
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country.81  The United States has had a standing army since soon after 
the Constitution was ratified.  However, the militia itself still exists and 
each state is in the control of its militia. 
Traditionally, the militia included “all subjects and citizens 
capable of bearing arms, regardless of age or parental authority.”82  The 
United States Code sets out a subset of the militia by defining it as “all 
able-bodied males at least 17 years of age. . . and under 45 years of age 
. . . .”83  The United States Code divides this subset of the militia into 
the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the 
Naval Militia, and the unorganized militia, which consists of the 
members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or 
Naval Militia.84  In 2018, 18 million Americans, or roughly seven 
percent of the population, were veterans.85  It can be fairly deduced 
from these statutory provisions and census numbers that most 
members of the unorganized militia have no military training. 
D. Likely Duties of the Militia 
A legislature's second step in regulating the militia is to 
determine what kind of duties militia members might be called to 
undertake.  Regular soldiers are full-time paid professional soldiers.86  
Regulars are members of the regular army, or standing army, of a 
nation.87  Irregulars are not part of a regular army, or standing army, 
 
81 See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, AUTUMN OF THE BLACK SNAKE 123-84 
(2017); see also G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 9 (regarding the 
militia's “unpredictability in battle”).  
82 S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L. J. 471, 471 
(1917). 
83 10 U.S.C. § 246(a).  
84 Id. § 246(b).  
85 JONATHAN VESPA, THOSE WHO SERVED: AMERICA'S VETERANS FROM WORLD 
WAR II TO THE WAR ON TERROR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP. NO. ACS-43 at 1 
(2020). 
86 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1041 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “regular” as 
“belonging to or constituting the permanent army of a nation …. [a] soldier belonging 
to a regular army”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (9th ed. 
1988) (defining “regular” as “one who is regular: as . . .  a soldier in a regular army”). 
87 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1041 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “regular 
army” as “[t]he permanent standing army of a nation or state”); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 992 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “regular army” 
as “a permanently organized body constituting the standing army of a state”).  
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and are raised for a special purpose.88  Militia members are not part of 
the standing army and are called only in case of emergency.89  
Accordingly, members of the militia who are called to service are 
irregular soldiers.  
As a historical matter, the performance of militias through 
United States history has been inconsistent.  In 1794 the Whiskey 
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania was subdued effectively by a force 
of 13,000 militiamen led by George Washington and provided by 
Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.90  However, the 
militia were of little use during the War of 1812.91  As the borders of 
the United States expanded westward, citizens saw less need for the 
militia, and musters of the militia waned and eventually expired.92  For 
most of the 19th Century, the United States augmented its military 
expeditions not with militia units themselves, but with volunteers from 
the militia.93 
From these facts, certain deductions can be made concerning 
“the preservation and efficiency of a well regulated militia.”94  If the 
militia was called, the potential number of members responding would 
be in the millions.  Furthermore, most militia members would have no 
military training or experience.  The most that the government could 
 
88 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “irregular” as 
“[a] soldier, such as a guerrilla, who is not a member of a regular military force”); 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 640 (9th ed. 1988) (defining 
“irregular” as “[a] soldier who is not a member of a regular military force”). 
89 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 796 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “militia” as 
“the armed citizenry as distinct from the regular army”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 753 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “militia” as “the whole body 
of able-bodied male citizens declared by law as being subject to call to military 
service”). 
90 G. GENTILE, ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 15 (“The militia performed below 
expectations.”).  
91 Id. at 19 (explaining that in 1814 the U.S. Army, augmented by the militia, was 
inadequate to stop a force of 5,000 British regulars from invading Washington, D.C., 
and burning the White House).  
92 3 JOHN E. JESSUP, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY: STUDIES OF THE 
HISTORY, TRADITIONS, POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES 
IN WAR AND PEACE 2074-75 (1994); BARRY M. STENTIFORD, THE AMERICAN HOME 
GUARD: THE STATE MILITIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6-7 (2002) (“The martial 
enthusiasm needed for an effective militia often waned, however, at the local, state, 
and federal levels.”). 
93 G. GENTILE ET AL., U.S. MILITARY POLICY at 18. 
94 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
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expect of those militia members who provided themselves with 
“ordinary military equipment” would be that they could load, fire, and 
maintain their own equipment. 
E. Ordinary Military Equipment 
Several observations can be made about the term “ordinary 
military equipment.”95  First, the decisions in Miller and Heller 
indicate that individual states can make their own decisions concerning 
what constitutes ordinary military equipment, given their reliance on 
Aymette, which upheld a Tennessee law concerning concealed 
weapons.96  Furthermore, as the court in Aymette explained, ordinary 
military equipment is intended to be carried openly and obviously, 
rather than concealed.97  There is no reason for a citizen who is 
mustered to protect the state to conceal the fact that he or she is bearing 
arms.  This indicates that so-called “concealed carry” statutes98 have 
no support in the Second Amendment.99  Naturally, a state legislature 
may choose to allow its citizens to carry concealed weapons, but the 
Second Amendment does not require it. 
Another important point is that “ordinary military equipment” 
means lethal weapons.100  While this observation may be distasteful, it 
 
95 Id. at 178. 
96 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840). 
97 Id. at 159 (“[T]he arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually 
employed military equipment …. not . . . those weapons which are usually employed 
in private broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber or assassin.”).  
98 Editorial, Going National with Concealed Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2017, at A26. 
99 As noted earlier, the Court in Heller stated that weapons permitted under the 
Second Amendment could be used for self-protection.  However, Heller referred to 
protection of “the hearth and home,” and added that it did not read the Second 
Amendment as permitting arms to be carried “for any sort of confrontation.”  District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008). 
100 The militia is described as “being necessary to the security of a free state . . . .”  
U.S. CONST. amend. II.  The function of the militia is to “execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.  
The “basic personal firearm of soldiers” is the rifle.  EDWARD LUTTWAK & STUART 
KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 487 (1991).  Soldiers may, on occasion, 
use non-lethal weapons for specific purposes.  DAVID P. FIDLER, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, 21 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 51, 52, 55-60 (1999).  Nevertheless, non-lethal weapons are not “ordinary military 
equipment” in “common use at the time” as described in Heller and Miller.  554 U.S. 
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also shows that incapacitating weapons, such as stun guns and 
chemical sprays, or other kinds of non-military weapons, are not 
protected by the Second Amendment and may be regulated without 
violating the U.S. Constitution or federal law. 
Finally, not every kind of military weapon is protected by the 
Second Amendment.  Only ordinary military equipment, and in 
particular, “certain types of weapons” which were “in common use at 
the time” are protected by the Second Amendment.101  “[D]angerous 
and unusual weapons” are not protected.102  Machineguns, short-
barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles are not protected by the 
Second Amendment.103  Since Congress is given power to organize the 
militia,104 and since most of the militia is unorganized,105 it can be 
deduced that weapons requiring training and cooperation between or 
among individuals, such as crew-served weapons, are also not 
protected by the Second Amendment.  Thus, ordinary military 
equipment means such small arms as an individual could carry into 
combat, chiefly rifles. 106  To a certain extent, other popular classes of 
arms, in particular handguns, can be ordinary military equipment.107 
A legislature would be most knowledgeable about the likely 
composition of its militia, the duties to which its militia would 
probably be assigned, and the need to preserve its militia and promote 
its efficiency. By using this knowledge, a legislature could well 
determine that other types of weapons were not suitable as ordinary 
military equipment. 
 
at 596; 307 U.S. at 178.  Suppressing insurrection and repulsing invaders requires 
“ordinary military equipment” that can be lethal in effect. 
101 Heller, 554 U.S. at 623-25. 
102 Id. at 627. 
103 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-62; see Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) (discussing short-
barreled shotguns); Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (discussing “machineguns”). 
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o provide 
for organizing arming, and disciplining, the Militia . . . .”). 
105 10 U.S.C. § 246(b). 
106 See generally 25 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 44 (2000) (defining “small 
arms” as weapons which could “be carried in the hand in combat”); EDWARD 
LUTTWAK & STUART KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN WAR 487 (1991) 
(defining “rifle” as “the basic personal firearm of soldiers”). 
107 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by 
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is 
invalid.”). 
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In connection with this point it is worthwhile to review why the 
Supreme Court struck down the District of Columbia's handgun 
regulation.  The Court in Heller stated that a legislature could not 
prohibit “an entire class of arms.”108  The Supreme Court noted several 
considerations that made a handgun useful for self-defense within the 
home, explaining that handguns were easier to store, may be easier to 
use than long guns, and that handguns could be operated with one 
hand.109  These considerations were suggested by amici.110 
F. Classes of Arms 
As noted at the beginning of this article, following many well-
publicized mass shootings, legislatures have been under pressure to 
regulate semi-automatic rifles and semi-automatic handguns.  An 
automatic firearm, such as a machine gun, is capable of firing rounds 
continuously until its ammunition is exhausted, as long as the trigger 
is depressed.111  A semi-automatic firearm fires a single round, ejects 
the spent cartridge, and loads another round with each pull of the 
trigger.112  Semi-automatic firearms are distinguished from other types 
of firearms which require a manual action, such as a bolt action, to 
eject the spent cartridge and load another round.113  Semi-automatic 
handguns are distinguished from revolvers, which are a type of 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 629.  
110 Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat a person using one will still have a hand 
free to dial 911.”).  
111 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 143 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “automatic” 
as being “capable of firing continuously until ammunition is exhausted”); MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 118 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “automatic” as 
“using either gas pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action for 
repeatedly ejecting the empty cartridge shell, introducing a new cartridge, and firing 
it”). 
112 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 796 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “semi-
automatic” as “ejecting the shell and loading the next round of ammunition 
automatically after each shot has been fired”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1069 (9th ed. 1988) (defining “semi-automatic” as “employing gas 
pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action to eject the empty cartridge 
case after the first shot and load the next cartridge from the magazine but requiring 
release and another pressure of the trigger for each successive shot”). 
113 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 166 (9th ed. 1988) (defining 
“bolt-action” as “loaded by means of a manually operated bolt”). 
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handgun containing a cylinder with multiple chambers, each of which 
is rotated into line with the barrel for firing.114 
G. Taxing Certain Types of Arms 
It is likely that, using the analysis the Supreme Court employed 
in Miller, and which was re-affirmed in Heller, a legislature that made 
appropriate findings could, in effect, regulate semi-automatic rifles, 
semi-automatic handguns, and extended magazines to the extent that 
they are not needed for use with the militia, and, accordingly, not 
needed for non-military purposes.  Some politicians have suggested 
confiscating firearms.115  A more effective and less controversial way 
to regulate semi-automatic rifles, semi-automatic handguns, and 
extended magazines would be to employ registration and a stamp tax 
of the kind used by Congress in the National Firearms Act of 1934 to 
regulate machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and short-barreled 
rifles.116  In this manner possession of these kinds of weapons would 
not be directly banned, but instead be made uneconomical. 
V. REGULATING ORDINARY MILITARY EQUIPMENT 
With this background and using the analysis the Supreme Court 
employed in Miller and Heller, a legislature could reasonably, 
effectively, and without controversy, discourage possession of semi-
automatic rifles.  Assume, for example, that a legislature wishes to 
regulate rifles to encourage its militia members to equip themselves 
with rifles with manual actions, such as rifles using bolt actions, which 
require that the users work the bolt after each shot to chamber another 
 
114 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1058 (2d ed. 1985) (defining “revolver” 
as “[a] pistol having a revolving cylinder with several cartridge chambers”); 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1010 (9th ed. 1988) (defining 
“revolver” as a “handgun with a cylinder of several chambers brought successively 
into line with the barrel and discharged with the same hammer”). 
115 See, e.g., Heather Murphy, Beto O'Rourke and Pete Buttigieg Battle Over 
Confiscating Assault Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/us/politics/beto-guns.html; Thomas Kaplan, 
Cuomo to Press for Wider Curbs on Gun Access, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/nyregion/cuomo-to-propose-more-
expansive-ban-on-assault-weapons.html. 
116 See 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (regarding transfer tax on firearms); see also § 5845(a) 
(defining “firearm”). 
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cartridge.  The state legislature could begin by making legislative 
findings concerning the members of its militia and the militia members' 
likely level of military training and expertise.  As demonstrated earlier, 
if the militia was mustered, its members could easily number in the 
millions.  Of these members, only a small minority would have any 
military training and experience.  Most of the militia members who 
had military experience would be out of condition and practice. 
The legislature could then make findings by identifying the 
ordinary military equipment that its militia members could be expected 
to use effectively.  As noted earlier, since the militia would be engaged 
in military duties, the ordinary military equipment would have to be 
lethal.117 
Nevertheless, the fact that militia members need lethal military 
equipment does not necessarily mean that militia members would need 
to have semi-automatic weapons.  Untrained and inexperienced militia 
members using semi-automatic rifles could easily fire repeatedly 
without discipline, waste ammunition, and endanger each other.  In 
fact, the larger the militia force, the more likely that such accidents 
would occur.118 
A legislature could reasonably find that, given the large number 
of militia members and each member's likely level of training, 
experience, and conditioning, it would be better if militia members 
were equipped with rifles with manual actions.  A militia member who 
can fire only one shot before working the action could reasonably be 
expected to choose what target he or she is shooting at, to aim at that 
target more carefully, and consider what he or she is doing before 
pulling the trigger.  Restricting ordinary military equipment to manual-
action rifles may not eliminate accidents, but it would probably reduce 
those accidents. 
The legislature could make findings on several other 
uncontroversial military considerations, such as the need to 
standardize kinds of ammunition to make resupply easier, and militia 
members' need for arms that are reliable and easy to use and maintain.  
Once these legislative findings are made, the state legislature could 
 
117 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
118 Sara J. Solnick & David Hemenway, Unintentional Firearm Deaths in the United 
States 2005–2015, INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY, Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 1, 2, 4 (presenting data 
concerning unintentional firearm fatalities in sixteen states reporting to the National 
Violent Death Reporting System). 
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then make laws that encourage possession of the types of weapons it 
feels are best suited to the needs of its militia while discouraging other 
types, such as, in this example, semi-automatic rifles. 
In a similar way, a legislature could discourage possession of 
semi-automatic handguns.  These types of handguns frequently have 
large-capacity magazines, are easily concealed and adapted to criminal 
purposes.  Under Heller, a legislature cannot ban an entire class of 
firearms, such as handguns.119  It can, however, discourage possession 
of semi-automatic handguns and encourage possession of revolvers, 
which chamber cartridges using smaller-capacity cylinders rather than 
magazines. 
Semi-automatic rifles have certain advantages, and manual-
action rifles have other advantages.120  Likewise, semi-automatic 
handguns have certain advantages, and revolvers have other 
advantages.121  After hearings a legislature is unlikely to find a 
consensus about what type of rifle or handgun would best promote the 
efficiency of a largely untrained, inexperienced, and unreliable militia.  
However, making decisions about the best way to accomplish an 
objective is the function of the legislature.122 
If a state enacts this type of firearm regulation, supported by 
legislative findings, a court will probably reject a constitutional 
challenge to the regulation.  The state legislature is not violating the 
 
119 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (“[A] complete 
prohibition of [handguns] is invalid.”) 
120 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 65 (1902-1903) (“Bolt-action [rifles 
are] efficient, reliable, and easy to manufacture and maintain . . . .”).  Semi-automatic 
rifles ordinarily use a gas-operated autoloading system that is more complicated than 
a manual-action rifle.  25 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 46 (2000).  However, 
semiautomatic rifles, which are loaded from a 20- or 30-round magazine, fire at each 
pull of the trigger, allow a higher rate of fire than do manual-action rifles.  Id. at 46-
47. 
121 Semi-automatic pistols, like semi-automatic rifles, are loaded using magazines 
which can hold more than ten cartridges.  Id. at 46.  Revolvers, by contrast, use 
rotating cylinders and normally hold six cartridges.  Id. at 47.  In addition, revolvers 
can chamber different sizes of cartridges, depending on the caliber of the revolver.  
Grant Cunningham, 5 Advantages of the Revolver, GUN DIGEST (Sep. 10, 2013), 
https://gundigest.com/article/5-advantages-of-the-revolver. 
122 Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Beach Commc’n, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (“The 
Constitution presumes that . . . even improvident decisions will eventually be 
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” 
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979))). 
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constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  It is merely regulating arms 
to preserve its militia and promote its efficiency.  The regulation would 
not affect the individual right to self-protection described in Heller 
because any firearm or weapon that has a military purpose can be used 
for protection “of hearth and home.”123 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Obviously, this type of regulation will not end the likelihood 
that firearms, whether acceptable for use by the militia or not, will be 
used for crime.  Manual-action rifles and revolvers are deadly 
weapons.  Nevertheless, this type of regulation could reduce the kind 
of mass shootings perpetrated by single gunmen that the country has 
seen in recent years.124  In addition, this type of regulation, to the extent 
that it sets guidelines for the militia and the right to self-protection, will 
be considerably easier to reconcile with the language of the Second 




123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635. 
124 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN 2020 at 2-4 (2021).   
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